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Abstract
We develop a multi-agent framework based on probabilistic cellular automata theory to
describe oﬀ-equilibrium dynamics in the context of the economic problem of price adjustment
in diﬀerent strategic situations as investigated experimentally by Fehr and Tyran (2001) and
(2008). It is found that the main experimental ﬁndings, namely suboptimal aggregate behavior
in terms of sluggish adjustment after a fully anticipated money shock, can be reproduced and
largely explained by the interaction of sophisticated and naive agents. Furthermore, a range
of conceptual issues as e.g. the source of endogenous beliefs on the other players rationality
is addressed within our multi-agent framework. We ﬁnd that, if costs/payoﬀs act as driver of
rational behavior, then endogenous beliefs and consequential aggregate behavior are driven
by the particular oﬀ-equilibrium time-dependent payoﬀ/cost proﬁle rather than by total oﬀ-
equilibrium payoﬀs/costs that naive agents face in the respective strategic situation.
∗University of Zurich and Study Center Gerzensee, yvesortiz@gmail.com
†Institute of Neuroinformatics, University of Zurich and ETH Zurich1 Introduction
Nominal rigidities, i.e. the failure of ﬁrms to adjust to the frictionless equilibrium price after
an exogenous shock, have been a central theme of economic research during the past decades.
It is well known that under so-called strategic complementarity, i.e. when an agent’s level of
activity depends positively on the other agents’ activity, multiple equilibria can arise, and sluggish
adjustment of prices after exogenous shocks occur. Research activity on this latter issue has
produced a wealth of competing theories to explain such sluggish adjustment of prices. Some
theoretical approaches introduce frictions (e.g. costly adjustment, outdated information, costly
information), others introduce diﬀerent sorts of limited rationality (e.g adaptive expectations,
rule of thumb agents). Haltinwanger and Waldman (1985) argue that strategic complementarity
magniﬁes deviation from equilibrium disproportionally and leads to more pronounced sluggish
adjustment to the new equilibrium allocation. This argument lead to a series of price setting
experiments by Fehr and Tyran (2001), in which they report remarkable sluggish adjustment
under strategic complementarity after a nominal shock, whereas adjustment takes place almost
instantaneously under strategic substitutability. At ﬁrst, it is not evident why a simple inversion of
a nearly linear reaction function as used by Fehr and Tyran (2001), while keeping the post-shock
equilibrium allocation unchanged, should have such a large impact on the adjustment process.
A few intuitive explanations of sluggish adjustment have been proposed in the literature, all
of them sharing the assumption of the presence of limited rational agents. In our contribution,
we suggest a multi-agent approach, based on a probabilistic cellular automata model. Such a, in
the economic literature relatively unknown, probabilistic cellular automata model allows for an
intuitive set-up of the model, while exhibiting at the same time very well the essential features of
the experiment as we will see. In our model, agents play either a adaptive backward looking or a
sophisticated forward looking price setting strategy. Sophisticated strategies take into account the
presence of adaptive strategies. As time evolves, sophisticated strategies played in the game be-
come predominant leading to convergence to the new equilibrium. Our model is able to reproduce
exactly the aggregate adjustment dynamics displayed in the experiment by Fehr and Tyran (2001).
In accordance with previous explanations reviewed in the next section, our model illustrates how
agents playing sophisticated strategies optimally refrain from choosing the rational equilibrium in
response to the presence of agents playing less sophisticated strategies given that the payoﬀ struc-
ture exhibits strategic complementarity. According to our model, observed diﬀerences in price
setting behavior right after the shock are only consistent with diﬀerent believes depending on the
payoﬀ structure. Under strategic complementarity (substitutability), agents expect sophisticated
strategies to be played with much lower (higher) probability.
Further, our model allows to eﬀectively track the expected payoﬀs of either strategy during
the entire adjustment process. This shows that although a adaptive strategy is heavily penalized
during the ﬁrst periods under strategic substitutability, it is less costly over the entire adjust-
ment process under strategic substitutability. This fact gives support to the conjecture that, if
costs/payoﬀs act as driver of rational behavior, then inﬂuence goes through the particular induced
time-dependent payoﬀ/cost structure rather than through total payoﬀs/costs prevalent in the re-
spective strategic situation. In other words, high immediate costs incurred by adaptive strategies
might exert a disciplining eﬀect on agents prone to play a adaptive strategy, while moderate but
persistent costs might encourage adaptive behavior.
In summary, we propose a model, based on a probabilistic cellular automata approach, that
is set up very simply and intuitively, but nevertheless allows to reproduce exactly the experimental
ﬁndings of Fehr and Tyran (2001). The model conﬁrms the literature, e.g. Haltinwanger and Waldman
(1989), insofar it stresses the role of strategic complementarity/substitutability and limited ratio-
nality in explaining nominal rigidities. It further suggests that closer attention has to be paid
to time-dependent cost structures induced by the presence of adaptive strategies, if coordination
failure is to be explained satisfactorily in stylized price setting experiments.
11.1 Related Literature
Many economic situations involve strategic complementarities in which the optimal action of a
single individual is an increasing function of the actions of the others (see Cooper and Haltiwanger
(1996), Cooper and Johri (1997) for macroeconomic evidence, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for
examples related to industrial organization). It has been shown that, departing from quite general
assumptions, strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria that can be pareto ranked (e.g.
Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Cooper and John (1988)). Apart from questions about
the selection and stability of the resulting equilibria, theoretical work has established that strategic
complementarities in conjunction with limited rational agents might magnify the response to real
and nominal shocks and lead to slower adjustment to equilibrium (e.g. Haltinwanger and Waldman
(1989), Haltinwanger and Waldman (1989)). The intuition underlying this theoretical result is the
following: under strategic complementarity, rational agents are forced to account for the actions
of limited rational agents and to mimic to a certain extent their suboptimal choices.
Fehr and Tyran (2001), tested these theoretical predictions in a price setting experiment. The
results of the experiment indicate that the participants have diﬃculties to coordinate their actions
to a new equilibrium after a fully anticipated nominal shock under strategic complementarity.
Interestingly, adjustment occurred almost instantaneously under strategic substitutability and,
thus, the ﬁndings of Fehr and Tyran (2001) conﬁrmed some of the theoretical predictions. In a
similar experiment Fehr and Tyran (2008), henceforth referred to as FT, demonstrate how agents
eﬀectively build diﬀerent believes on the other’s play depending on the strategic situation.1 Sub-
sequent experimental work has conﬁrmed FT’s ﬁndings while reﬁning their results in diﬀerent
aspects (Davis (2009), Davis and Korenok (2010)).
There are hitherto only few explanations of these new experimental ﬁndings. The results
of Haltinwanger and Waldman (1989) merely state that, given the presence of a ﬁxed fraction of
agents with adaptive expectations, the rational agents’ optimization implies a choice value close to
the value chosen by the adaptive agents. Indeed, Davis and Korenok (2010) ﬁnd that around 20%
of the players behave as price setters with adaptive expectations under strategic complementarity.
Camerer and Ho (2004) calibrate their so-called Cognitive Hierarchy Model to predict the outcome
of Fehr and Tyran (2001), which is accomplished by assuming that agents’ forward reasoning
involves more time steps under strategic substitutability than under strategic complementarity.
Davis (2009) and FT execute simple simulations with agents following ad-hoc behavioral rules
which cannot fully account for the adjustment dynamics observed in the experiments.
After all, it remains at ﬁrst sight puzzling why people evidently form diﬀerent believes on the
other people’s rationality depending on the strategic situation. FT presume that believes might be
endogenous with respect to the payoﬀ structure in that the mistake made by an adaptive strategy
is salient under strategic substitutability. As a consequence, players playing an adaptive strategy
will recognize their mistake more easily and, this fact being common knowledge, believes and
actions will converge quickly to equilibrium.
In contrast to the existing explanations, our model emphasizes the role of oﬀ-equilibrium
payoﬀs/costs by quantifying explicitly the costs from deviation (i.e. not playing best response)
incurred by either strategy during oﬀ-equilibrium time. Our model is parsimonious and only
a few simple behavioral assumptions are required: agents playing sophisticated, forward looking
strategies take into account the presence of adaptive strategies and maximize their expected payoﬀs
during oﬀ-equilibrium play. Adaptive strategies adopt the realized average price as their pricing
strategy for the next period. Further, the fraction of either strategy played is not ﬁxed but evolves
endogenously such that the number of agents playing adaptive strategies tends to zero as the
average price converges to the new equilibrium level. The interaction of agents playing these
two strategies generates the adjustment process observed in FT. The resulting time dependent oﬀ-
equilibrium payoﬀ/cost distributions can then also shed light on the possible sources of endogenous
belief forming.
1Players form diﬀerent believes when they know that they play against fully rational computerized agents. It
turns out that believes and average price then converge quickly to equilibrium under complementarity as well.
21.2 The Fehr and Tyran Experiment
FT’s experiment was conducted with several groups of n persons. Each person plays a price setting
game choosing a price (i.e. acting as a ﬁrm) and getting a payoﬀ in the next period. The game
extends over T = 30 periods and the payoﬀs are realized according to a payoﬀ table distributed
to the players at the beginning of the game. Player i can easily infer that his own payoﬀ, Π
t+1
i ,
strongly depends on his pricing decision, P
t+1
i , and the average price of all other players in the
next period, P
t+1
−i . Payoﬀ tables entail an unique Nash-Equilibrium in the pre-shock and post-
shock period. Throughout the ﬁrst T/2 periods, the game is played with the ﬁrst payoﬀ table
and all players set the equilibrium price P∗
0 after a short adjustment phase. In period T/2, a
new payoﬀ table is distributed to the players, identical to the ﬁrst table up to the fact that all
payoﬀs and prices have been divided by two. Since the players know that the game will be played
according to the new table from period T/2 + 1 until the ﬁnal period T, the subjects face an
exogenous and fully anticipated nominal shock with the new equilibrium price P∗
1 = P∗
0/2. Figure
1 visualizes the diﬀerent adjustment paths. FT also run a test for statistical signiﬁcance: Under
complementarity, the hypothesis that the average price Pt is equal to the equilibrium price P∗
1
can be rejected at the 1% level during the ﬁrst 8 periods after the shock. Under substitutability
however, the hypothesis that Pt is equal to the equilibrium price P∗
1 can never be rejected. The key
points of FT’s experimental set-up are thus the following: First, all agents have full information
about all relevant aspects of the game and they are free to set any price for which a payoﬀ is
deﬁned without any further restrictions. Second, players are rewarded according to real payoﬀs,
πt
i = Pt
i / ¯ Pt, that is, a nominal shock does not alter the equilibrium payoﬀs. Third, under the
rational agent hypothesis, players should realize that a nominal shock leaves the real payoﬀs of the
game unchanged and choose the new equilibrium price once the nominal shock becomes eﬀective.
Figure 1: Nominal Average Prices. Source: Fehr and Tyran (2008)
2 Probabilistic Choice Approach
We employ a probabilistic choice approach to reproduce and analyze the main features of the
adjustment dynamics reported in the experiment by FT. In the experiment, every agent’s choice
depends crucially on his believes about the other agents’ price setting choices; the average of all
agents’ choices becomes common knowledge at the end of every period through the realized average
price. This particular feature in FT’s experiment led us to model the agents decision procedure
by means of a simple probabilistic choice rule where the choice probability of an agent depends
on the average choice of all other agents. More precisely, we model the choice procedure with a
probabilistic cellular automata model where the choice probability of the next period depends on
the agent’s current choice and the current observed average price.
3In the next section, we introduce probabilistic cellular automata and motivate the probabilistic
choice rule we use. We also give an economic interpretation of the probabilistic choice rule, based
on the related models of myopic learning.
2.1 Probabilistic Cellular Automata
The approach we use to model FT’s experimental ﬁndings is based on a probabilistic cellular
automata model. We ﬁrst introduce cellular automata of which the probabilistic cellular automata
are a stochastic generalization.
Cellular automata (CA) are discrete dynamical systems. The state of a CA is speciﬁed by a set
of discrete values of the sites of a regular, uniform inﬁnite lattice, i.e. by the states of the ”cells”
of a CA. A CA evolves in discrete time steps with the states of the cells determined by a rule
acting on a neighbourhood of each cell. Cellular automata (CA) models have been widely studied
and applied in physics, biology and computer science, see e.g Kari (2005) or Wolfram (2002). In
the economic literature, there seem so far only few applications of CA, as e.g. a CA model for the
dynamics of stock markets by Qiu et al. (2007).
We introduce here further only the restricted class of one-dimensional CA. The one-dimensional
CA is further assumed to be ﬁnite, that is the lattice L of the CA is assumed to be of ﬁnite length
N with periodic boundary conditions, i.e. L = Z/NZ. The conﬁguration of such a ﬁnite, one-
dimensional CA is given by the sequence x = (xi)i∈L with xi ∈ S being elements of some ﬁnite
set of states S = {0,1,...}. If the state set S is given by S = {0,1}, we speak of a binary CA.
The conﬁguration space X is the set of all sequences x, i.e. X = SN. The global map F is the
map F : X → X where the local transition function is the map f : S2r+1 → S, r ≥ 1, with
F(x)i = f(xi−r,...,xi,...,xi+r). The integer r speciﬁes the range of the neighbourhood and is
called the radius of the CA. The iterations of the map F acting on an initial conﬁguration x
completely determines the temporal evolution of x, hence such CA are called deterministic.
The model proposed below is based on a stochastic generalization of the ﬁnite, one-dimensional
and deterministic CA introduced above, which is called a probabilistic cellular automata (PCA).
The dynamics of PCA is still generated by the local transition function, but the next state of a
cell is now only known with a given probability. Hence, the local transition function becomes a
local probability transition function. In the binary case, which is used in our model, the local
probability transition function is deﬁned by p : {0,1}2r+1 → [0,1], where p is the probability that
the cell i updates to state 1 at time t + 1 given the states of its neighbourhood (xt


















i)]),∀i ∈ L, where Bt
i is a series of independent Bernoulli random variables, i.e. Bt
i(p)
is a random variable equal to 1 with probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p. It is understood
that xt
i denotes the random variable given by observing the state of cell i at time t.
















the local probability transition function. Evidently, any (ﬁnite) PCA is a (ﬁnite) Markov chain.
The PCA model proposed below is peculiar insofar the local probability transition function
pt










2.2 A Probabilistic Choice Rule
Key to our model is the mapping of FT’s experimental set-up to a setting which can be handled
within the mathematical framework of PCA. In FT’s experiment, there are two states in the
economy, say {s0,s1}, represented by the two diﬀerent payoﬀ tables. We identify the N agents
4in the economy with the N cells of a PCA. The agents in the economy can choose between two
prices, denoted by {xi0,xi1}. Choosing the prices is identiﬁed with the states of the cells (agents)
of the PCA and consists in choosing the old or the new equilibrium prices, P∗
0 or P∗
1 respectively.
According to FT, the prices are given by the values {P∗
0,P∗
1 } = {25,12.5}, which are encoded in
our model as {0,1}. We ﬁx the time when the shock occurs (s0 → s1) at t = 0. Agents observe the
realized average price at t=0,1,2,... and decide on their price setting actions shortly afterwards,
namely at t = t+ǫ with 0 < ǫ ≪ 1. For time periods t ≥ 0, the individual choice probabilities pt
i




ρt + (1 − ρt)ˆ β if xt
i = 1
ρt + (1 − ρt)ˆ α if xt
i = 0,
(2.2)
where ρt denotes the realized density in period t and β and α take values in the interval [0,1].
The probabilistic rule (2.2) speciﬁes a PCA with the local probability transition function pt
i, since




i,ρt]. The initial transition probabilities p0
i are exogenously
given. As shown later, the parameters α and β are determined such that they reﬂect an ”adaptive”
or ”sophisticated” strategy. For the adaptive strategy, the parameter α is determined such that
agents with xt
i = 0 take the observed price in the economy at time t as their expected choice for
the next period t + 1. For the sophisticated strategy, the parameter β is determined such that
agents with xt
i = 1 maximize their expected payoﬀ for the entire adjustment period, given the
payoﬀ structure of the game. From now on, we refer to an agent as a sophisticated agent (SA) if
he chooses the sophisticated strategy, i.e. if xt
i = 1, and as an adaptive agent (AA) if he chooses
the adaptive strategy, i.e. if xt
i = 0. In the following section, we give an economic interpretation
of our probabilistic choice rule.
2.3 Economic Interpretation
Our model shares several features with a model of myopic adjustment proposed by Droste et al.
(2003) and Kosfeld et al. (2002). In their model, players increase the probability of playing strate-
gies which are a best reply to the actions played by the other players. This assumption is related
to the idea of reinforcement learning, where pure strategies that were more successful in past
periods are more likely to be played in future periods. If a strategy was not the best response,
then Kosfeld et al. (2002) assume that agents play the strategy with the same probability as in the
previous period. This particular probabilistic adjustment rule determines a discrete time Markov
process for the set of mixed strategies.2
In our model, agents playing the sophisticated strategy (i.e. SA) have a positive probability
to change their state and thus to play the myopic strategy in the next period; the respective
argument applies for agents playing the myopic strategy (i.e. AA). Such an adjustment rule can
be interpreted as a simple model of individual learning. In our particular case, agents playing the
sophisticated strategy forget their strategy with the probability 1 − [ρt + (1 − ρt)ˆ β] and recall it
with the probability ρt + (1 − ρt)ˆ α. A more in-depth discussion and an additional interpretation
based on social learning can be found in Kosfeld et al. (2002).
As shown in the appendix, the fraction of agents playing the sophisticated strategy will only
grow (i.e. E[ρt+1] > ρt) as long as βρt > α(1 − ρt) and thus, our rule displays reinforcement for
suitable values of ρt, β and α. Ceteris paribus, the latter reinforcement condition is more easily
satisﬁed for higher values of ρt. That is, the more agents are playing the sophisticated strategy,
the more the rule will display reinforcement.
In the next section, we explain in detail the simulation procedure and how the parameters α
and β, corresponding to an adaptive and a sophisticated strategy, can be determined.
2In a recent paper, Rivas (2008) shows that the probabilistic adjustment rule proposed by Droste et al. (2003) can
be viewed as a particular case of a more general class of Markovian learning models (Stochastic Better Response).
53 Simulation Procedure
We describe now the driving process behind the key variable ρt and the resulting price formation
process. The random variable ρt is simulated iteratively departing from an initial value ˜ ρ0:
i) Every xt
i is drawn from a uniform distribution with parameter p
t−1
i .
ii) The obtained conﬁguration xt = (xt
1,xt
2,...,xt





iii) ρt is used to specify pt
i.
vi) Iteration is restarted at t + 1.
Evidently, the parameters α and β in (2.2) are the key determinants of the random variable ρt.
The parameter values will partly result as solution of an optimization problem described in the
next section. In a ﬁrst step, optimization calculus requires the construction of the price series Pt
implied by the price setting decisions of our agents. We deﬁne the prevailing price in the economy
as
Pt = ρtP∗
1 + (1 − ρt)P∗
0 (3.1)
and thus Pt is the weighted average of those agents who choose the new equilibrium (Pt
i = P∗
1 )
and those who choose the old equilibrium (Pt
i = P∗
0 ). The average price Pt is by construction the
last stochastic element of the series {P}t ≡ (P1,P2,...,Pt) which can be examined through its
statistical measures such as its average { ¯ P}t and quantiles {Q}t.3 A closer look at the relation
between the price variable (3.1) and the probabilistic rule (2.2) reveals the underlying intuition. As
demonstrated in the next section, the expected payoﬀs in the period t+1 depend on the expected
distance between the agent’s price and the average price, |Pt+1-P
t+1
i |. This distance depends again
on the choice of β and α in the choice probability rule pt
i. If e.g. the group of AA happens to be
non-empty, then the expected average price Et[Pt+1] will diﬀer from the new equilibrium price.
Under certain circumstances, the presence of agents playing the adaptive strategy will induce the
group of SA to refrain from setting their price too far away from the average price during the
adjustment phase, causing sluggish adjustment of the entire system towards the new equilibrium
price.
In the next section, we put this intuition on more formal grounds. In particular, we describe
the ensuing optimization problem of SA facing actions of AA and obtain their optimal response
in terms of an optimal choice of β.
3.1 Determining the Model Parameters
The standard approach to derive optimal behavior in a dynamic price setting situation would
involve game theoretic concepts. An agent would optimize his pricing decision for the next period
subject to the probable actions of all other agents. The complexity of such a task is evident.
Therefore, we simpliﬁed in our model several aspects of the problem. First, we consider only
two types of agents, adaptive agents (AA) and sophisticated agents (SA), both tied to a linear
probabilistic choice rule with α and β as the parameters of choice. Second, SA optimize their
choice only subject to the actions of the AA, i.e. the choice has the character of an optimal
collective choice. In what follows, we formulate and solve SA’s optimization problem. We break
this task up into three sub-tasks:
1. Construction of a payoﬀ function similar to the payoﬀ function employed in FT.
2. Formulation of SA’s optimization problem ⇒ deriving ˆ β depending on α and ˜ ρ0.
3. Choice of α and ˜ ρ0 ⇒ determining ˆ β.
3A detailed description how { ¯ P}t and {Q}t are constructed can be found in appendix A.
63.1.1 The Payoﬀ Function
Optimization typically requires the deﬁnition of the underlying payoﬀ structure. In our case, we
stick as far as possible to the payoﬀ function which FT employ to generate their payoﬀ tables. In
fact, we use an accurate linear approximation of FT’s payoﬀ function for the sake of simplicity. This
simpliﬁcation leaves our results unaltered since we reproduce the main properties of FT’s function
and both functions diﬀer from each other only in marginal aspects. The following derivation of
the payoﬀ function becomes clearer if read together with the accompanying ﬁgures in appendix
C.1. As in FT, our payoﬀ function is build along a reaction function rf which gives the optimal
individual price response ˆ Pt for every realization of the average price Pt, that is
ˆ Pt = rf(Pt)
= a + bPt.





A + γ1(1 + b2)
1
2Pt+1 for Pt+1 ≤ a
1−b
A + γ2(1 + b2)
1
2Pt+1 for Pt+1 > a
1−b.
(3.2)
The costs of deviating from the optimal response is assumed to be linear in the distance:
c
t+1
i = Ψ|rf(Pt+1) − P
t+1
i |. (3.3)


















As shown in the appendix C.2, our payoﬀ function (3.4) provides a good approximation of FT’s
payoﬀ function once suitable values for the parameters {A,a,b,γ1,γ2,Ψ} are chosen.
3.1.2 Optimization Problem
In this section we state SA’s optimization problem. We need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 Let Et[P
t+1
SA ] ≡ E[Pt+1|xt
i = 1,β,α,ρt] and Et[P
t+1
AA ] ≡ E[Pt+1|xt
i = 0,β,α,ρt] be
the expected price set by an agent, given its type and {β,α,ρt} at time t. Analogously, Et[Pt+1] ≡
E[Pt+1|β,α,ρt] denotes the expected value of the average price given {β,α,ρt}.
Deﬁnition 1, together with the linearity of our payoﬀ function (3.4), allows to express the expected











i ],Et[Pt+1]), i = SA,AA. (3.5)




AA ] and Et[Pt+1]. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.




AA ] and Ek[Pt+1] can be computed iteratively
and depend solely on the parameters α, β and an initial value ρk, k=0,1,2,....
The reader is referred to appendix B for a derivation. Proposition 1 enables us to compute
the cumulated expected (“nominal”) payoﬀs of an SA and AA along the entire adjustment path
characterized by β, α and ˜ ρ0, that is




















i |β,α, ˜ ρ0
￿
i = AA,SA, (3.7)
7where the second equality follows from Proposition 1, the law of iterated expectations and the
fact that our simulation takes ˜ ρ0 as initial information. The price level adjusted (“real”) payoﬀ is
then given by





i |β,α, ˜ ρ0]
E[Pt+1|β,α, ˜ ρ0]
i = AA,SA. (3.8)
SA solve the following optimization problem:
max
β
E0 [πSA(β;α, ˜ ρ0)]. (3.9)
Note that SA maximizes the “real” payoﬀs, leaving no space for money illusion. We now proceed
to pin down the free parameters α and ˜ ρ0.
3.1.3 Choice of α and ˜ ρ0
To determine the parameter α we resort to a behavioral assumption. AA are assumed to set their
price such that Et[P
t+1
AA ] = Pt. Roughly speaking, AA choose the prevailing price Pt as their own
price for the period t + 1. This assumption leads to the following result:
Proposition 2 Et[P
t+1
AA ] = Pt is satisﬁed if and only if α = 0.
As demonstrated in appendix 1, this result follows straightforward from deﬁnition 1. In defense
of the underlying assumption, we would like to point out the following: In our case, we consider
two extreme strategies, reﬂected in the adaptive and the sophisticated probabilistic choice rule.
Undoubtedly, one could come up with numerous choice rules, especially for a naive agent type.
We believe however that the adaptive choice, as introduced above, stands out due to its extreme
simplicity. The execution of the adaptive choice rule demands virtually no computational skills
from a naive agent, since he does nothing but to adopt the average choice as his own. We therefore
argue that our behavioral assumption is a simple but appropriate representation of a naive agent’s
behavior. Finding a starting value ˜ ρ0 however, goes beyond tackling a mere technical diﬃculty; it
calls for a discussion on the nature of heterogeneity itself. At time t = 0, when the payoﬀ shock
becomes eﬀective, individual price setting decisions are allocated at rational equilibrium level. In
spite of this displayed uniformity, it seems implausible to infer that agents are sophisticated to
the same degree. Once agents are confronted with a new choice situation, e.g. due to a change of
state, heterogeneity will become prevalent and will aﬀect future aggregate behavior. Sophisticated
agents will recognize how to choose optimally in the new situation, while less sophisticated will
not. In terms of our model, we would therefore like to infer the distribution of AA and SA that
emerge shortly after the payoﬀ shock, that is, we would like to determine ˜ ρ0 ≡ ρ0+ǫ which allows
us to compute E0 [πi(β;α, ˜ ρ0)].
As derived in appendix B, the dynamics of ρt is governed by the following relation
E[ρt+1|β,α,ρt] = ρt + ρt(1 − ρt)β + (1 − ρt)2α. (3.10)
We naturally identify the expected value at t = 1 by setting E[ρ1|β,α, ˜ ρ0] = ρdata
1 . Along with
α = 0, our model requires ˜ ρ0 and ˆ β to jointly satisfy the following equations
ρdata
1 = ˜ ρ2
0 + (˜ ρ0 − ˜ ρ2
0)(ˆ β + 1) (3.11)
ˆ β = argmax
β
E0[πSA(β;0, ˜ ρ0)], (3.12)
where the ﬁrst equation (3.11), as already stated, is a special case of (3.10) and the second equation
(3.12) stands for the necessity of β to satisfy the optimality condition (3.9). The ﬁnal parameters
which solve the optimization problem are easily found by a ﬁxed point iteration departing from
starting values ρdata
1 and βstval
1 = argmaxβ E1[πSA(β;0,ρdata
1 ]). The starting values as well as the
ﬁnal values are summarized in Table 1. Figure 2 visualizes the relation between β ∈ [0,1] and





˜ ρ0 0.383 0.776
ˆ β 0.378 1.000
Table 1: Initial Values and Optimal Values
the expected ’real’ payoﬀs of SA in both strategic situations. An explanation for the curves that
result can be formulated as follows: A small value of β (e.g. β = 0.1) will lead to slow convergence
whenever some AA participate and to costs due to coordination failure. On the other hand, SA
are free to enforce faster convergence by setting e.g. β = 1. Under strategic complementarity (ct),
this strategy entails large initial costs originated by large temporary deviations from the optimal
response in early periods. Clearly, under ct, the payoﬀ maximizing β must be an intermediate value
in [0,1] that accounts for this trade-oﬀ between ineﬃcient oﬀ-equilibrium time and deviation costs.
As illustrated in appendix C.2, optimality of ˆ β is reﬂected by the fact that SA’s expected price
choice will move almost perfectly along the optimal reaction function during the entire adjustment
phase. In other words, SA is able to anticipate the entire expected adjustment path of the average
price depending on β,α, ˜ ρ0 and to choose β such that expected costs are minimized during the
adjustment phase.
Under strategic substitutability (st), things are simple: SA’s optimal response is to set β = 1
no matter how many AA are present in the game.4 We now turn to the results of our simulations.



































Figure 2: Sum of Expected Real Payoﬀs for β ∈ [0,1]
3.2 Simulation Results
The simulation of {P}t, { ¯ P}t and {Q}t is based on the price setting decisions of N = 100 agents
and robust with respect to the number of agents N. Even though the obtained series are more
volatile for smaller number of agents the general pattern is always preserved. Figure 3 contrasts
FT’s empirical ﬁndings on the left panel with our simulation results in the right panel. Both,
the empirical price series and the simulated realization of the price series, {P}t (solid line), are
4Actually, it would be even optimal to overshoot slightly by setting a price below P∗
1 , an action not supported
in our model.








































Figure 3: Simulation on {P}t, { ¯ P}t, {Q}t
shown embedded within the average price series { ¯ P}t (dashed line) and the quantile series {Q(q)}t
(dotted lines). The time window covered in the ﬁgures starts at the time when the shock occurs,
i.e t = 0 and extends for T = 14 periods after the shock. Our speciﬁcation manages to reproduce
the behavior of the average price series found by FT in both strategic situations. Under strategic
complementarity (ct), it takes 14 periods for the mean price series to adjust to the new equilibrium
price P∗
1 = 12.5 whereas the single realization of {P}t adjusts after 13 periods. Interestingly, the
0.05-quantile intercepts the equilibrium price level line at period t = 8, in agreement with rejection
of the null hypothesis, (H0 : Pt = 0), during the ﬁrst 8 periods based on Fehr and Tyran’s data.
The strategic substitutability (st) case appears as a trivial outcome. On one hand, SA choose
the new equilibrium price with certainty already in the ﬁrst period. On the other hand, the group
of AA immediately after the shock, i.e. 1− ˜ ρ0, is small. Thus, there is nothing else to expect than
immediate adjustment of the average price to the new equilibrium prize as illustrated in appendix
C.3.
Our model manages to reproduce several features of the empirical price series during the
adjustment phase as found by FT. First, we obtain the price series as the realization of a stochastic
process with variance and mean close to those in the data. Second, convergence of a price series
realization is reached with 90% probability within periods t ∈ [8,15], which, in view of FT’s results,
seems to be a good approximation. Third, our model generates an exponentially falling average
price series that matches the price series found by FT.
4 Further Implications
Recalling that ρt gives the fraction of agents playing the sophisticated strategy leads to the nat-
ural interpretation of ρt as the degree of rationality of the (stylized) economy at time t. With
this concept in mind, we can proceed to examine and interpret our ﬁndings with regard to ˜ ρ0.
As exposed earlier in this paper, agents’ allocations are identical at t = 0, displaying apparent
uniformity. If we put ourselves in SA’s position at time t = 0, we barely recognize any valuable
information from which to infer how many agents will play adaptive. Consequently, ˜ ρ0 remains
essentially an unobservable variable in our model5. On the other hand, FT’s experimental results
clearly report agents to form diﬀerent expectations on the other agent’s actions depending on the
strategic situation. In an additional control experiment, FT observe a much faster price adjust-
ment in ct when agents are confronted with completely rational computerized agents (of course,
5Remember that we estimated ˜ ρ0 ex-post using the ﬁrst price observation.











Costs of an Adaptive Agent, α=0, (β=0.378, ρ
0=0.383)










Figure 4: Costs of AA in ct and st
players were truthfully informed about the nature of their opponents). Noteworthy, strong (but
not perfect) adjustment takes place already in the ﬁrst period after the shock.
The cited evidence suggests that believes on the other agents’ ability indeed aﬀects aggregate
outcome. In line with the concept sketched above, ˜ ρ0 can interpreted as the degree of rationality
within the economy that emerges just an instant after the shock, or alternatively, as the (correct)
believes of agents playing the sophistacated strategy on the fraction of agents that will play
the sophisticated strategy right after the shock. From a purely technical discussion, we obtained
˜ ρ0 = 0.38 in ct and ˜ ρ0 = 0.77 in strategic substitutability (st), meaning that the rationality induced
by st is larger than by strategic complementarity (ct). Although this ﬁndings seem to conﬁrm
our views as well as those expressed in FT, our model does not give any deeper explanation for
this result. In a ﬁrst step, one could think of two simple cases, to explain irrational or suboptimal
behavior in strategic choice situations namely, people are just not able recognize the optimal choice
or, alternatively, people are perfectly aware of optimal choice but they (correctly or mistakenly)
believe that other people are not. We see two main factors that may aﬀect individual rationality
as as well as beliefs on the other people’s rationality. First, we think that cognitive accessibility
to optimal choice plays a role. The harder a problem, i.e. the less accessible, the more agents will
struggle to ﬁnd the optimal choice. In an exemplary diﬃcult situation, not a single person will be
able to infer the optimal choice. As the problem becomes less diﬃcult, some people will recognize
the optimal choice, but correctly believe that other people will not. In the case where optimal
choice is obvious, agents may mistakenly believe that some other agents may opt to deviate from
optimal behavior and thus, irrational aggregate behavior will turn into a matter of coordination
failure. Second, monetary incentives may be a valid driver of both individual rationality and
beliefs on other agents’ rationality. Agents will typically, but not necessary, put more eﬀort in
ﬁnding optimal choice or action when payoﬀs or costs at stake are higher. Moreover, monetary
incentives could help to correct mistaken beliefs that lead to the coordination failure problem
described above by punishing deviations from optimal behavior.
While examining the inﬂuence of cognitive accessibility (and other psychological factors) on
individual rationality and beliefs clearly lies beyond the scope of this work6, our model allows us
to calculate the costs an adaptive agent has to bear in both strategic situations. Motivated by
the previous discussion, we assume that ˜ ρ0 mainly depends on individual rationality and beliefs
on other people’s rationality, both driven by psychological factors and the costs from being AA.
To compare the costs of being AA on equal grounds, we assume that both strategic situations
6FT for example, argue that the error of behaving adaptive is much more salient under substitutability, which
may induce people to think more carefully about their price setting decisions.
11are perceived equally, i.e. we calculate the costs of being AA departing from the same ˜ ρ0 in both
strategic situations. Figure 4 illustrates the period by period costs of being AA in both strategic
situations. Total costs in ct are 25% higher than in st, which clearly contradicts the hypothesis
that total costs could come into question as a driver of rational behaviour. On the other hand,
a closer look at the cost structure leads to interesting considerations. Under st, AA incurs a
very large part of the costs (95%) during the ﬁrst three periods. It seems plausible to assume
that readily identiﬁable costs would inﬂuence the behavior of less sophisticated agens. Or putting
it diﬀerently, it seems implausible to assume that payoﬀs/costs far oﬀ the period t = 0 could
have a major inﬂuence on the behaviour of less sophisticated agents as the estimation of these
payoﬀs/cost would require more sophisticated reasoning. Summarizing, if payoﬀs/costs play any
role as a driver of individual rationality and beliefs, then, as we ﬁnd, the inﬂuence comes through
the payoﬀ/cost structure rather than the overall payoﬀ/costs that adaptive strategies face.
5 Conclusions
Fehr and Tyran (2008) demonstrated experimentally that in a certain strategic situation, known
as strategic complementarity, suboptimal aggregate behavior can occur in terms of sluggish price
adjustment after a fully anticipated money shock. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic cellular
automata model that is capable to reproduce this interesting observation. In addition, and by
means of our model, we can provide a further analysis of the economic problem apparent in the
experiment of Fehr and Tyran.
As laid out in detail in the paper, our model says that suboptimal aggregate behavior, which
expresses itself through sluggish adjustment to rational equilibrium, arises from the interaction
of agents playing adaptive strategies with agents playing sophisticated strategies. We ﬁnd that,
under strategic complementarity, the presence of agents playing adaptive strategies induces agents
with sophisticated strategies to (optimally) deviate from rational equilibrium in order to minimize
their costs during the ineﬃcient transition phase. Our analysis suggests that the oﬀ-equilibrium
payoﬀ structure of agents playing adaptive strategies is key for understanding the suboptimal
aggregate behavior in a repeated game experiment as the one set up by Fehr and Tyran (2008).
Under substitutability, agents playing the adaptive strategy incur 95% of total costs within the
ﬁrst three periods of the transition phase. Under complementarity, total costs are higher but
evenly distributed across periods. Ceteris paribus, high immediate costs punishing suboptimal
adaptive strategies seem to exert a greater disciplining eﬀect on aggregate behavior than high
total costs.
The almost perfect match between the predictions of our model and the experimental ﬁndings
of Fehr and Tyran (2008) suggests that probabilistic cellular automata models provide a valuable
tool to model the oﬀ-equilibrium dynamics manifest in certain economic problems. Generally, our
results indicate that the oﬀ-equilibrium payoﬀs of adaptive strategies in repeated games experi-
ments that display non-negligible oﬀ-equilibrium eﬀects should be evaluated more systematically.
The resulting time-dependent oﬀ-equlibrium payoﬀ proﬁles may then help to identify and cate-
gorize the payoﬀ structures which can cause coordination failures in real experiments and real
economies.
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13A Description of Average Price and Quantile Series
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SA ρt−1 + p
t−1
AA(1 − ρt−1)
= (ρt−1 + (1 − ρt−1)β)ρt−1 + (ρt−1 + (1 − ρt−1)α)(1 − ρt−1)
= ρt−1 + ρt−1(1 − ρt−1)β + (1 − ρt−1)2α.
Let us denote Et−1[ρt] = E[ρt|α,β,ρt−1], then the result is written as
Et−1[ρt] = ρt−1 + ρt−1(1 − ρt−1)β + (1 − ρt−1)2α (B.1)
= f(β,α,ρt−1). (B.2)
Let us now calculate Et−1[ρt+1] and note that the transitions probabilities pt
SA and pt
AA are only
known in expectations, i.e. Et−1[pt
SA] and Et−1[pt
AA]. Because the process is Markovian, the
Chapman - Kolmogorov equation holds Van Kampen (1981), that is
Et[ρt+1] = f(β,α,Et−1[ρt]) (B.3)
14holds.
Let us assume ρk to be known. By denoting fl = f ◦ f ◦     ◦ f
| {z }
l
and keeping (B.3) in mind we










AA ], Ek[Pt+1] follows straight forward from the fact that these
price variables are linear combinations of ρt.
Proof 2 From the deﬁnition of the expected price, we know Et[P
t+1
















⇔ ρt + (1 − ρt)α = ρt,
which is solved by α = 0 as long ρt < 1.
15C Additional Graphs
C.1 Schematic Illustration of Payoﬀ-Function
Figure 5: Schematic Illustration of Payoﬀ-Function




































Payoffs as used in Fehr and Tyran
Individual Price
Π
Figure 6: Own payoﬀ function vs. payoﬀ function in FT




γ1 = γ2 30 30
Ψ 200 200
Table 2: Parameter Values of Payoﬀ Function
C.3 Simulation Results for st




































Figure 7: Simulation on {P}t, { ¯ P}t, {Q}t
17C.4 Various Adjustment Paths and their Corresponding Payoﬀs










Case ct |  P
t
SA for  β=0.1 (α=0, ρ
0=0.383)















Case ct |  P
t
SA for  β=0.378 (α=0, ρ
0=0.383)















Case ct |  P
t
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Figure 8: Adjustment Paths for Various Values of β
Note: To shorten notation we set Pt ≡ E0[Pt], Pt
SA ≡ E0[Pt
SA] and rf(Pt) ≡ rf(E0[Pt]).




































































Figure 9: Corresponding Period by Period Payoﬀs
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